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troubadour of globalization—argued for
a spirit of liberal internationalism that
leads logically to efforts at humanitarian
intervention. To Mandelbaum, the
apparent difference between liberal
internationalism and the humanitarianinterventionist approach that some U.S.
presidents have chosen is that the United
States decided to use its resources to rescue people (metaphorically) rather than
to concentrate on defending the global
system of economic liberalism. However,
how one “defends a system” without
intervening in particular crises within
that system remains rather unclear.
Liberal internationalism supposedly is
an antidote to great-power politics, but
ultimately Mandelbaum concludes that
America’s failure at preserving its beneficial role in the international system (and
its interests) was the result of not paying
most of its attention to, and sometimes
accommodating, the reemerging
great powers. The “malign effects” of
an angry Russia and a contemptuous
China, Mandelbaum writes on his final
page, “will be felt long after the failed
missions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
Kosovo, and even Afghanistan and Iraq
ha[ve] faded from memory” (p. 381).
SAM J. TANGREDI

The Forgotten Front: Patron-Client Relationships
in Counter-Insurgency, by Walter C. Ladwig III.
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017. 360
pages. $34.99 (paperback).

The advent of a new U.S. presidential
administration has resulted in a series
of new defense guidance and strategy
documents—ranging from the National
Security Strategy to the National Defense
Strategy and the Nuclear Posture
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Review—all of which have placed a
clear emphasis on the risks posed
by the recrudescence of great-power
rivalry. The National Defense Strategy,
in particular, garnered praise from the
national security commentariat for
its terse declaration that great-power
competition, rather than terrorism,
now constituted “the primary focus of
U.S. national security.” Indeed, for an
American public increasingly weary of
costly and protracted counterinsurgency
(COIN) campaigns in the Middle East,
there was something inherently appealing about this apparent reordering
of American defense priorities.
Unfortunately, however, events over the
past year have demonstrated repeatedly
that this much-touted focal rearrangement is not something that simply can
be wished into existence. Indeed, despite
running on a platform promising greater
disengagement from the Middle East,
President Trump has found himself
compelled to deploy ever more soldiers
to Afghanistan and the Levant. Meanwhile, cabinet officials have suggested
that Washington may need to maintain
an open-ended military presence in
Syria, partly as a means of countering
growing Iranian influence. Last but not
least, the deadly ambush of a unit of U.S.
special operations forces (SOFs) in the
deserts of Niger revealed to many baffled
American citizens the full extent of their
nation’s global counterterrorism footprint: eight thousand SOFs active on any
given day in more than eighty countries.
All this underscores the need for
U.S. security managers to continue to plan for and debate extended
counterterrorism and stabilization
campaigns—however much they
may pine privately for a post-COIN
era. It also renders Ladwig’s recent
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book—which engages in a thoughtful
and historically informed study of the
patron-client relationship in irregular
warfare and counterinsurgency—all the
more timely. Dr. Ladwig, a professor in
the Department of War Studies at King’s
College London, has provided an erudite
and intellectually stimulating book,
one that does a fine job of shedding
light on some of the shortcomings of
the more recent COIN literature.
Ladwig’s central premise is that one of
the assumptions at the heart of recent
American writings on COIN—that
a security patron and its client will
enjoy a variety of shared goals and
interests—is misplaced. “In fact,” he
notes, “the historical record suggests
that maintaining power is frequently a
competing priority for an incumbent
regime, which means that many of
the standard reform prescriptions
for counterinsurgency—streamlining
the military chain of command,
ending patronage politics, engaging
in economic reform, and embracing
disaffected minority groups—can appear
as threatening to a besieged government
and its supporters as the insurgency
itself.” When dealing with regional
partners—particularly those afflicted
with nepotism, deeply factionalized
internal power structures, and tense
civil-military relations—there always
will be a strong potential for strategic
misalignment or dyssynchrony, or both.
Paying attention to a client’s inner
travails and patterns of dysfunction
is only the first step, however, in
convincing it to conform to U.S.
wishes. Ladwig outlines two archetypal
“influence strategies” that patron states
traditionally have employed as a means
of persuading their junior partners to
enact more-effective and convergent
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policies. The first, inducement, aims to
reassure and win over the client with
generous flows of aid and unqualified
professions of U.S. support. The second
approach, conditionality, takes more
of a “tough love” approach: calibrating and rationing U.S. support in
accordance with the client’s ability or
willingness to cooperate and deliver.
The book contains three detailed
historical case studies of past U.S.
support efforts: one that can be qualified
as a success (the Philippines during the
Hukbalahap Rebellion, from 1946 to
1954); one that is an all-too-well-known
failure (South Vietnam under Ngô Đình
Diệm, from 1955 to 1963); and one that
falls somewhere in between (El Salvador
during the 1979–91 civil war). Each case
study is richly textured, drawing on extensive archival research and declassified
government materials. Given enough
potential material for three books, the
author was wise to select these three
cases to juxtapose; they provide a useful
kaleidoscopic study of the successes and
failures of U.S. foreign internal defense
(FID) policies during the Cold War.
Unsurprisingly, the author notes that
there are no simple solutions to the
issues that traditionally have plagued
patron-client relationships. FID always
winds up being a more complex
and challenging undertaking than
originally planned. That said, policies of
conditionality—which “require making
credible threats to a client and careful
managing of commitments”—are clearly
preferable to policies of pure inducement, which not only are ineffective
but can have pernicious second-order
effects. The challenge is to maintain a
degree of strategic consistency while
devising conditionality-based
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approaches that can survive not
only different administrations and
electoral cycles but interagency differences and bureaucratic turf wars.
One of this reviewer’s only regrets is
that—barring a few segments in the
introduction and conclusion—the
author chooses not to apply his findings
to the study of more-contemporary
COIN campaigns. Dr. Ladwig has
acquired a reputation in the field of
South Asia studies for his careful,
methodical approach to the region’s
security challenges, and it would have
been useful for the reader to get a better
sense of his take on the past, present,
and future of U.S. policy on Afghanistan.
It also might have been interesting to
explore the challenges that come with
more-multidirectional proxy wars,
such as that currently unfolding in
Syria, which involves multiple potential
clients and competing “candidate
patron” states, ranging from Turkey to
Russia and Iran. These are all minor
quibbles, however, and ones that Ladwig
no doubt can address in a follow-on
study, should he wish to do so.
All in all, this is an excellent and
well-timed contribution. Moreover,
despite being an academic work, it
also is an example of the virtues of the
more interdisciplinary, even subtle,
approach to security studies embraced
by European institutions such as King’s
College. Drawing not only on wellresearched history but on other social
sciences such as economic theory, The
Forgotten Front is refreshingly jargonfree and clearly written, thus making it
an ideal study companion for readers
of the Naval War College Review.
ISKANDER REHMAN
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Anatomy of Failure: Why America Loses Every
War It Starts, by Harlan Ullman. Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2017. 272 pages. $29.95.

When former Secretaries of State
General Colin Powell and John Kerry
and former Supreme Allied Commander
Europe Marine general Jim Jones (for
whom I worked when I commanded
the International Security Assistance
Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan when it
expanded across the whole country)
call Harlan Ullman’s Anatomy of Failure
a must-read, people should pay attention. And for those who worry about
policy books being boring, House of
Cards creator Michael, Lord Dobbs
deems Anatomy, in another blurb, a
combination of the works of best-selling
thriller novelist Tom Clancy and Carl
von Clausewitz. All are correct.
In the interests of full disclosure, the
writer and I have been friends and
colleagues since my time at ISAF. As
Britain’s Chief of the General Staff and
then Chief of the Defence Staff, I worked
with Ullman on many issues. Irrespective of this, Anatomy is essential reading
for practitioners and students of foreign,
defense, and national security policy.
The book’s center of gravity is the asking
and answering of the vital question
of why, since World War II, America
arguably has lost all the wars it started
and has failed in military interventions
in which it did not have just cause
to participate. This question alone
directly challenges the accepted view
in Washington that America has the
best and most formidable military in
the world. If that is the case, despite
some stunning tactical successes, why,
at the strategic level, has its record in
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